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Lang recognized as an important and abiding influence in
the European artistic and intellectual circles of the last century,
the work of Pierre !<Iossowski is slowly gaining recognition
in the Anglo-American scholarly community.l The older
brother of the painter Balthus, a friend of Rilke and Gide,
and a celebrated artist in rus own right, !<Iossowski is a difficult
if not impossible trunker to categorize. From quite early on
in his career, Nietzsehe was an important influence on
Klossowski's work. In addition to translating two volumes
for Nietzsche's Oeuvres Completes (1967, 1976)2 and Heidegger's
four-volume work on Nietzsehe (1971),3 !<Iossowski also wrote
a number of essays on Nietzsehe as well as a book, Nietzsehe
et le Cercle Vieieux (1969).4 In a note to Difftrenee et Repetition,
Gilles Deleuze, citing "Nietzsehe, Polytheism, and Parody" as
weil as "Forgetting and Anamnesis in the Lived Experience
of the Eternal Return of the Same," writes that !<Iossowski's
work "renewed the interpretation of Nietzsche."s
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"Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody" is the final essay
of I<lossowski's book, Un sifuneste desir (Such a Deathfy Desire) ,
first published in 1963.6 It is one of two essays in the book
that are devoted explicitly to Nietzsche; the second, "On Some
Fundamental Themes of Nietzsche's Gaya Scienza," is the
opening essay of the volume and had previously appeared as
an introduction to Klossowski's translation of The Gay Science.7
"Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody" had not previously
appeared in print, although I<lossowski had presented it as a
lecture at the College de Philosophie in Paris in 1957. Together,
the two essays on Nietzsche bound aseries of reflections on
Gide, Blanchot, Bataille, and others, all of which appeared
previously-sometimes in a different form-and that taken
together explicate I<lossowski's conception of "the demon."
The conception of the demon, drawn from The Gay Science,8
. is for I<lossowski a figuration of the double life of the existing
human being: both conscious, rational, goal-directed, as weIl
as vital, passionate, a victim of intensities.
One of the chief concerns of I<lossowski's work on
Nietzsehe, including the present essay, is the communicability
of Nietzsche's thought. 9 For IZlossowski, the possible
communication of this work must be taken up and thought
according to the internallogic of Nietzsche's own writings-
which include both his published works and his letters and
notes. However, rather than merely seeking to judge the
accuracy, appropriateness, or truthfulness of this thought-
aIl styles of interpretation that would preserve arefuge for
the interpreter, a distance from the thought under
consideration-I<lossowski implicates the interpreter within
the interpretation. This is not to say that bis work on Nietzsche
is an attempt to restate Nietzsche's thought, or to somehow
clarify or explain it. Klossowski takes Nietzsche as the bearer
or sign of a complex of symptoms, and his essay maps the
strategy of this engagement according to the three intertwined
elements announced by the title.
To begin with Nietzsehe is not to begin with a
historicaIly existent being or with an author. As I<lossowski
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makes clear by referring to the ail-too-recent appropriations
of Nietzsche's works (as weil as "Nietzschean" concepts and
styles) by the Nazis, the word "Nietzsche" is only a mark, a
sign. To divide or merely juxtapose the historical inclividual
and the content of the works that bear his name is to ignore
the in.junctions of both against seeing either as independent
of a single experiment. According to this experiment,
Nietzsche the professor of philology at Basel gives way to
the more audacious figure of the later works (from The Gqy
Science through the final letters), but then this "visionary"
Nietzsche-as !(1ossowski describes him-gives way, in turn,
to the figure of Zarathustra. This double movement repeats
the logic of the transformation of the true world into a fable,
as described in a famous passage from Twilight of the Idols:10
the proposal of the audacious line of thinking by the professor
who, as a teacher, is interested in the truth; the impossibility
of the actualization of this thought within a teachable form;
and the resultant production oE the character of Zarathustra,
of an "actor," therefore neither truthful nor merely apparent,
that foilows from the necessary coincidence of thought and
its impossibility.
Polytheism seems to be a late topic of the essay, hardly
worthy of inclusion in the title. But polytheism is for
!(1ossowski the product of Eabulation-the being oE the
fable-itself the product of the recoil oE Nietzsche's thought
upon itselE, of his notion oE fatum. Fatum is the conjunction
or synthesis oE uttering nonsense ("raving") and prediction;
oE the moment prior to the creation of meaning and the
moment following that meaning's accomplishment. For
Klossowski, such a synthesis is effectuated "in the forgetting
(of the historical situation) that was preliminary to the act oE
creating: in forgetting, t11e past is remembered [sous-vient a) by
humans as their future, wmch takes the figure of thepast."ll The
nonsense oE raving is not mere gibberish; it is the utterance
oE the cliscontinuity lurking within the inclividual. As such, it
is a type oE speaking that Eorgets its place in time - placement,
or order, being what gives any utterance its proper meaning-
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and, in losing its place, reveals that place as a moment in
which the past comes to determination by being set into an
order and thereby given a meaning. Rendered indeterminate
by the raving that counters its own utterance, the one who
speaks is undercut by the momentum of the vital impulses
of the past that sustain but no longer submit to the yoke of
the determining consciousness. In raving, the determinate
one is rendered into the vital multiple, and this multiplicity
is nothing other than the persistence of the paste
The notion of fatum, however, conjoins this vital will
to live with the rational will to truth: prediction, the positing
of the goal of action. Not only is this antinomy not to be
overcome-it cannot be sublated, for Nietzsche or
Klossowski-it is itself constitutive of the highest aspiration
of thought: the eternal return. How then are the poles of
this antinomy conjoined? Pathos, "the unconscious life of
impulses," is what raves as consciousness "sub-comes" to its
own vitality. But, in reflecting on this vitallife, consciousness
inverts these very impulses; it forms an image of them as
goal-seeking, where the search for a goal is the distinctive
mark of conscious willing. Stripping this mark away,
"unthinking" consciousness, the impulses are satisfied in what
I<lossowski calls their "dissipation" [depenseJ. This unconscious
life is exposed in moments of vital exuberance (of pain or
pleasure) whose intensity is grasped only retrospectively and
always with the inkling that this remembering is itself a
forgetting of the most essential aspect of the experience. In
the accomplishments of pathos, of unconscious impulses,
the greatest desires of life are satisfied, but these are the very
desires that consciousness sets out to fulfill in its search for
truth. Consciousness, then, as the impulse or will to stabilize
the impulses themselves through the determination of the
ends or goals of their activity-and this is the will to truth
that foreteils, that predicts the constancy that will be
satisfaction-in fact wills its dissipation insofar as this
dissipation is the accomplishment of the activity (as activity)
of vitality. The will to truth engenders fabulation, the
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"necessity" of the reversal of the life of consciousness such
that the raving of fatum, which is always apprehended
retrospectively, could become the object of prediction. This
is the circular law of the eternal return.
Truth as willed error-the law of thought discovered
in Nietzsche-is formulated finally as the combative
juxtaposition of two gods: "Dionysus versus the Crucified."
But this duality is that of the one and the many, not of two
distinct unities. Polytheism is the expression of the "raving,"
vital aspect ofexistence; "God is dead" expresses a liquidation
of the guarantor of identity, and not a simple transfer (to
humanity, for instance). Individual existence becomes
fragmentary, fortuitous, insofar as it is discovered as the
unstable equilibrium of vital and rational forces. In its need
for stability, for meaning, and therefore for identity, the
individual does not come upon but is swept under by the
heterogeneous aspirations of the unconscious impulses that
are conjoined with consciousness by chance. Every individual
is a perpetual moment-and a perpetuum mobile-of
equilibrium, of creation and the reverence that preserves what
is created. The world is thus filled with those gods and
goddesses (figures of the will to externalization) engendered
by this equilibrium, deities with as many forms as there are
expressions of vitality: jealous, warlike, loving, wrathful, crafty
gods capable of unlimited couplings, combinations and
transformations.
Finally, parody. !<lossowski cautions at the outset of
the essay that no other author seems to lead their interpreter
to parody as Nietzsche does. Indeed, what could be more
inclined to repetition than a thought that conjoins the will to
create and the will to revere-the twin temptations of the
interpreter. On the one hand, a will to fill the lacunae, to
reconcile the apparent contradictions, to orient and subsume
the author's work to a single purpose or thesis. On the other
hand, a will to celebrate the insights that ring true and excoriate
those that ring false, to prioritize the passages that are, for the
interpreter, those that are most deeply affecting, to singularize
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the insights or blunders even as they are repeated, to revere
or to condemn (which itself is merely an inversion of
reverence) under the guise of critical engagement. The very
tide of the essay signals I<lossowski's acknowledgement of
tbis bind, and his persistence ensures bis parody. But this very
acknowledgement voids the essay's pretensions to singularity,
its own prejudices. It thus concludes with laughter-the voice
of an ass, repeated, and serving as the affirmative seal of the
pathos implicated within its thesis.
DePaul University
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